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imposed upon burial insurance associations since the same considerations do
not apply to both. For example, there is no need to require the maintenance
of a large reserve by associations offering burial insurance. Since the performance required of the insurer is to render services rather than to pay cash,
the guarantee that there will be a solvent concern able to perform the services
when the obligations mature should be the paramount consideration. Positive
comprehensive legislation along the lines of the North Carolina enactment
and embodying the desired features of other codes is the best answer for
the abuses inherent in the association device. In states where the new
regulations would tend to overburden the insurance commissioner, provision
can be made for a special commissioner, as in North Carolina, or an experienced board, as in Oklahoma, to control and supervise the formation and
operation of burial associations.
CHARLES T. CADY

COUNTY HOME RULE IN TENNESSEE
The movement for home rule for local government began in 1875 and
now 19 states have constitutional provisions conferring home-rule powers
upon cities and six state constitutions grant home-rule powers to counties.1
Several additional states have some scheme of legislative home rule.2 The
existence of home rule for local governments gives them powers in one or
both of two general categories: (a) power to determine the form and organization of local government; and (b) power to determine and regulate matters
which are of local concern as distinguished from those of state-wide interest.3
Home rule is said to benefit both the local government and the legislature,
permitting the former to determine its form and activities of government and
4
the latter to devote more time to general state policies.
Increasing attention has been given to the problems arising out of the
legislative control of local governments in Tennessee through the use of
special legislation. 5 In view of the difficulty-heretofore impossibility-of
amending the Constitution of the State of Tennessee the question arises as
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to the extent to which the General Assembly can authorize counties to
determine local matters.
The Constitution of the State of Tennessee contains a provision relative
to the separation of powers. 7 Presumably this provision emphasizes the
concept of the non-delegability of legislative power. Thus the question is
presented as to the extent that the Tennessee General Assembly can delegate
authority to counties to determine their own affairs. The rule of the nondelegability of legislative power appears generally not to apply to delegations
of power to municipal corporations. 8 Delegation of legislative power to
counties ordinarily is not permitted. 9 Doubtless this distinction in the extent
to which legislative power can be delegated reflects the fact that counties are
regarded as lesser forms of government than are municipal corporations.' 0
The suggestion has been made" that adequate authority can be found in the
present constitution to permit the General Assembly to authorize a substantial
amount of county home rule. The purpose of this inquiry is to examine the
validity of that suggestion. Manifestly constitutional change would not be
required if the General Assembly may act under existing grants of power.
The Constitution of the State of Tennessee provides: "The Legislature
shall have the right to vest such powers in the courts of justice, with regard
7. "The powers of the Government shall be divided into three distinct Departments:
The Legislative, Executive and Judicial. . . . The Legislative authority of this State
shall be vested in a General Assembly. ...
No person or persons belonging to one of
these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the
others, except in the cases herein directed or permitted." TENN. CoxsT., Art. II,

§§1, 3, 2.

8. "The legislature may, without violating the rule forbidding it to delegate its lawmaking power, delegate to municipal corporations and to their proper officers or boards
all powers, whether legislative or otherwise, which are incident to municipal government
and of purely local concern." 16 C.J.S., Conwstitutional Law § 140 (1939). The Supreme
Court of Tennessee has expressed the rule ". . . it has always been held, and never denied,
that the power to create corporate bodies for all municipal purposes, and with the means
of self-government, is a legitimate exercise of sovereignty on the part of the state by its
legislature; and that there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States, or of
the state, restraining or prohibiting the exercise of such power by the state." Hope v.
Deaderick, 27 Tenn. 1, 6 (1847).
9. "While powers vested by the constitution in the legislature may not, as a rule,
be delegated to county commissioners or other governing authorities of a county, the
legislature, unless restrained by the constitution, may delegate to such authorities powers
with respect to purely local matters, even though the exercise of such powers may involve
not only administrative, but also quasi-legislative, functions." 16 C.J.S., Constitutional
Law § 140 (1939).
10. "Counties are not created for the purpose of general government, and because of
this fact it has been said that they are corporations of low character, and cannot discharge corporate duties in the broad sense in which municipalities can discharge them.
...[C]ounties have their creation in the Constitution, and the statutes confer on them
all the powers which they possess, prescribe all the duties they owe and impose all the
liabilities to which they are subject. Considered with respect to their powers, duties, and
liabilities, they stand low down in the scale of corporate existence. They are ranked as
quasi corporations." Weakley County v. Carney, 14 Tenn. App. 688, 698 (W.S. 1932).
See 20 C.J.S., Counties §§ 1, 3 (1940).
11. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, HousE Rxs. No. 27.
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to private and local affairs, as may be expedient."12 This provision first
appeared in the constitution of 18341s and was carried into the still unamended
constitution of 1870 without change. The background of this provision in
the constitutional convention of 1834 is relevant to this inquiry.
A committee to study the problems of private and local legislation was
appointed by the constitutional convention on June 14, 1834.14 On July 24
the committee reported proposals relative to denying the legislature the power
to grant divorces, authorize lotteries, or establish other than a rate of interest
uniform throughout the state.' 5 The committee recommended on July 29
that the General Assembly be prohibited from passing other than general
laws' 6 and the provision quoted above.' 7 In connection with this last recommendation the committee pointed out that formerly the General Assembly
had wasted much time in passing laws to authorize individuals to hawk and
peddle without a license, to release fines and forfeitures, to grant letters of
administration, and to authorize mill dams and fish traps.' 8
The first General Assembly to meet under the constitution of 1834
authorized the county courts' 9 to take certain action "conformable" to the
constitutional provision being examined here. The caption of the enabling
statute read: "An Act to authorize the several County Courts which are now
or may hereafter be established in this State, to grant the privilege of building
bridges, erecting fish dams, and such other private or local improvements, as
in their discretion shall be right and proper, and as shall be conformable to
the 7th and 8th sections 20 of the 11th article of the Constitution of the State
'1
of Tennessee."'
12. TENN. CoNs?. Art. XI, § 9.
13. McCLURE, STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING 448 (1916).
14. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF STATE OF TENNESSEE
POSE OF REVISING AND AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 78
JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION.

CONVENED FOR THE PUR-

(1834), hereinafter cited

15. Id. at 155. See TENN. CONST. Art. XI, §§ 4, 5, 6 (1834)
Art. XI, §§ 4, 5, 7.
16. Note 34, infra.
17. JoURNAL OF THE CONVENTION 190 (1834).

as

and TENN. CONST.

18. Id. at 191. Apparently without specific constitutional permission the General
Assembly earlier had authorized county courts to license and establish ferries. Tenn.
Acts 1804, c. 1, TENN. REV. LAws 415 (Haywood 1815). The Supreme Court in
Memphis v. Overton, 11 Tenn. 386, 391 (1832) held that the legislature had the power
to pass the statute, but the court did not indicate the source of the legislature's authority.
The constitution of 1796 did not have a separation of powers clause. The separation of
powers clause first appeared in the constitution of 1834.
19. Presumably the General Assembly intended to confer the power on the quarterly
county court which is the usual governing body of the county. For a general discussion
of county government in Tennessee, see SImS, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN TENNESSEE
(1930).
20. Now TENN. CoNST. Art. XI, §§ 8 and 9.
21. Tenn. Acts 1835-36, c. 29. This provision, as codified in TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 3047 (Williams 1932), has been construed as follows: "The authority of the County
Court under this section of the Code, has no reference to works of public improvement,
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The conclusion that the framers of the constitutional provision intended
to authorize the General Assembly to permit counties to act in a rather limited
field is thus strengthened by the early legislative interpretation.
Two problems have been considered by the courts in connection with
the constitutional provision we are examining: (a) the determinatiorf of
"courts of justice" and (b) the delineation of subjects with which the General
Assembly may permit the courts of justice to deal.
The first General Assembly that had authority under Article XI, § 9
assumed that the county court was a court of justice within the meaning of
the constitutional provision. 22 The provision of the statute which expressed
that determination appears not to have been challenged in the courts. In
1907 the Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision did not
authorize a delegation of power to incorporated towns. 23 The Supreme
Court's most recent statement on the subject is that "courts of justice" are
".... the governing bodies of the county, which is the county court, or a board
of commissioners with substantially all of the statutory powers and functions
of the quarterly county court."'24 All recent legislative interpretations of the
term "courts of justice" have followed this statement by the Supreme Court.
The General Assembly has infrequently exercised its power under the
constitutional provision of Article XI, § 9. The first General Assembly to
have such power authorized the county courts to grant the privilege of building toll bridges and causeways across bottoms, fish traps, mill dams and public
ferries, 23 and public roads. 20 In 187227 the court stated with approval "Under
to be undertaken, made and paid for by the county, but to those private enterprises

undertaken with more or less reference to the public convenience, but for private gain,
which require to be licensed, or may be regulated by the County Court, and are in the
nature of privileges." Hunter v. Justices of Campbell County, 47 Tenn. 49, 55 (1869).
22. Tenn. Acts 1835-36, c. 29.
23. Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907).
24. Henderson County v. Wallace, 173 Tenn. 184, 189, 116 S.W.2d 1003, 1005 (1938).
Perhaps earlier decisions can be distinguished on their facts. In interpreting TENN.
CoNsr. Art. XI, § 9 in Hickman v. Wright, 141 Tenn. 412, 210 S.W. 447 (1918) the

court said that that provision permitted the General Assembly to delegate to the chancery,
circuit and criminal courts authority to determine the number of deputy clerks they
required and to fix the salaries of such deputies. Such action, said the court, ". . . would
not be imposing nonjudicial duties on the courts." Hickman v. Wright, supra, at 423, 210
S.W. at 450. Earlier the court had said: "This section [Art. XI, § 9] cannot be reconciled with the thought that the quarterly county court is the exclusive agency of the
constitution for the local government of the counties. Inferior courts of justice may be

ordained at the discretion of the legislature (section 1, art. 6) and it may vest in them
such powers in respect of local affairs as it may deem expedient, and not conflicting
with some other provision of the constitution. And so it may in the circuit and chancery
courts." Prescott v. Duncan, 126 Tenn. 106, 133, 148 S.W. 229, 235 (1912).
25. Tenn. Acts 1804, c. 1,

TENN.

Rzv. LAws 415 (Haywood 1815), had authorized

county courts to license and establish ferries. This statute was upheld in Memphis v.
Overton, 11 Tenn. 386 (1832), but the court did not indicate the source of the legislature's authority. In Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 432, 103 S.W. 798, 809 (1907)
the court referred to Memphis v. Overton and stated, "We do not find anything in that
case, or in any prior case, setting forth the grounds of this grant [of authority to the
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this provision [Article XI, § 9] of the Constitution the Legislature has
vested in the County Courts the power defined in the Code in regard to taxa-

tion 28 and to roads."

The court suggested that the authority of the General

Assembly to confer power on the county courts was without limit as to
subject 2 9
Only in more recent years has the court considered attempts by the
General Assembly to delegate to the county courts power in fields other than
those envisioned by the members of the constitutional convention of 1834.
In 1937 the court upheld a statute permitting county courts to determine the
places at which beer dealers might do business. 30 In considering a statute
in 1938 which authorized county courts to determine whether voting machines
would be used in the counties the court said: "It is . .. competent for the
Legislature to leave the matter of the location of voting machines to the
county courts just as it leaves to those bodies the matter of the location of
ferries, roads, bridges and beer dealers. The local authority is of course in
a better position to determine where these machines will be of most service."31
The court recently upheld an act 32 which authorized a county council to
33
enact ordinances, a violation of which was made a misdemeanor.
The power of the General Assembly to authorize the quarterly county
courts to take action with respect to local matters has been progressively
extended by judicial interpretation. Manifestly the quarterly county courts
can now act on many subjects not contemplated by the framers of the constitutional provision being considered here. This result may be one of the
virtues of the judicial process. Are there limits to the power of the General
Assembly to delegate authority to the quarterly county courts?
Presumably the General Assembly would be limited only by the restriction on special legislation.3 4 The General Assembly may constitutionally
county courts to license and establish ferries]. However, since the constitution of 1834,
and of 1870, went into effect, the power to delegate has been ascribed to . .. [Art. XI,
§ 9] ; or at least the power must be found to reside there."
26. Tenn. Acts 1835-36, c. 29. See note 21, supra.
27. Grant v. Lindsay, 58 Tenn. 651, 666 (1872).
28. Chief Justice Nicholson apparently neglected his Tennessee constitutional history

when he wrote the word "taxation."

In Taylor McBean & Co. v. Chandler, 56 Tenn.

349, 372 (1872) the court stated that TENN. CONST. Art. II, § 29 (1834) was inserted
to overcome the decision in Marr v. Enloe, 9 Tenn. 408 (1830) that under the constitution of 1796 an act authorizing county courts to levy a tax was unconstitutional.
29. County courts ". . . can exercise that portion of the sovereignty of the State
communicated to them by the Legislature and no more. In the exercise of the powers
so conferred they become miniature legislatures, and the powers so exercised by them,
whether they are called municipal or police, are in fact legislative powers." Grant v.
Lindsay, 58 Tenn. 651, 666-67 (1872).
30. Wright v. State, 171 Tenn. 628, 106 S.W.2d 866 (1937).
31. Mooney v. Phillips, 173 Tenn. 398, 405, 118 S.W.2d 224, 227 (1938).
32. TExN. P.I. AcTs 1947 ,c. 346.
33. Donathan v. McMinn County, 187 Tenn. 220, 213 S.W.2d 173 (1948).
34. TENN. CoNsT. Art. XI, § 8: "The Legislature shall have no power to suspend
any general law for the benefit of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for the
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enact a special act affecting one particular county in its political or governmental capacity but generally such act cannot be contrary to the provisions
of a general law applicable to all counties.a 5 The General Assembly has an
opportunity to avoid the plague of special legislation in this field initially by
passing general rather than special enabling statutes with respect to the power
of quarterly county courts in local matters.
The present Tennessee Constitution as interpreted by the courts permits
to grant to the governing boards of counties a considerable
legislature
the
amount of power to determine and regulate matters which are of local concern.
There is no reason to doubt that the legislature could authorize county governing boards great freedom in determining the form and organization of county
government. Thus the General Assembly could go far in establishing county
home rule in Tennessee.
The chief difficulty in relying on the General Assembly's granting considerable authority under the existing constitutional provision to the governing boards of the counties to determine local matters is that the General
Assembly could repeal the enabling act.36 Thus counties would not be protected from the General Assembly as many advocates of constitutional home
rule feel desirable.
HENRY N. WILLIAmS
benefit of individuals, inconsistent with the general laws of the land; nor to pass any
law granting any individual or individuals, rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions,
other than such as may be, by the same law, extended to any member of the community
who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law. No corporation
shall be created, or its powers increased or diminished by special laws, but the General
Assembly shall provide by general laws, for the organization of all corporations hereafter created, which laws may, at any time, be altered or repealed; and no such alteration
or repeal shall interfere with, or divest, rights which have become vested."
35. Darnell v. Shapard, 156 Tenn. 544, 3 S.W.2d 661 (1928); Clark v. Vaughn,
177 Tenn. 76, 146 S.W.2d 351 (1941).
36. Presumably the remarkable decision that the Tennessee General Assembly cannot
repeal its act as announced in Biggs v. Beeler, 180 Tenn. 198, 173 S.W.2d 1944 (1943)
would not be followed. See Williams, The Poll Tax and Constitutional Problems In.
volved in Its Repeal, 11 U. OF Ciii. L. Rxv. 177 (1944).

